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Abstract
This paper demonstrates that three of the basic ap-
proaches to the solution of the social choice problem are in
fact equivalent to one another. All will yield the same
social decision functions--a winning set of permutations of
the actions. The Combinatorial Optimization criterion of
Blin and Whinston is shown to be monotonically related to
the Kemeny function criterion proposed by Levenglick. The
set covering formulation for the ｾ Ｑ norm case devised by
Merchant and Rao is also shown to be equivalent to the other
two. The geometrical aspect of the problem is also discussed
and an example is provided.
Introduction
Recently several authors have proposed methods for deter-
mining a social ordering of a set of alternatives based on
individual pairwise ordering of the set. In each case the
author had a different motivation for developing the particular
function, but in all cases it was shown that a relationship
existed between majority voting and the resulting social order.
In this paper we show that all these formulations of the problem
lead to exactly the same social ordering of alternatives when
the data on pairwise preference is identical.
Combinatorial Optimization Criterion
The Combinatorial Optimization criterion function of Blin
and Whinston [1] seeks to determine a best ranking of actions
such that the sum of vote proportions of each action over those
lower ranking actions is maximized. This optimal assignment of
actions to ranks is determined by a permutation on the original
order of the actions [a 1 ,a2 , •.. ,am] to get [ap (1),ap (2) , ••• ,ap(m)]'
such that p(i} = k implies that a i has k-1 actions considered
superior to it.
*Purdue University
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Let A = [a .. ] be the matrix of vote proportions such that:
1.J
a .. - proportion of individuals who have a. > a.
1.J 1. J
proportion of individuals who have a. < a.J 1.
o (rather than the alternative value 1/2)
The case of individuals who have a. '" a. (non-resoluteness) is
1. J
discussed in [5] and can be resolved by either method described
there.
Define Q = [qij] as the appropriate summation matrix with:
q .. = {O
1.J 1
Then,
if
if
i > j
i < j
¢ <p) ;::: lo1ax Ap ｾ Qp
is the desired criterion function where
Ap = [ap (i) p ( j ) ]
(1)
Here ap(i)p(j)qij > 0 implies that the permutation p has ranked
action i over action j, and the dot product of two matrices of
the same dimension is defined as
Since p is a permutation, we can define the corresponding
permutation matrix Pp = [Pkj] as
={01Pkj if a j has rank k
otherwise
-3-
Now A = P Api, and (1) can be rewritten to emphasize itsp p p
Quadratic Assignment nature
¢(p) = Max PAP' • Qp p p (2)
This criterion function seeks to determine the optimal assign-
ment of actions to ranks, p, over all feasible m! permutations
of the a i •
Kemeny Function
The Kemeny function seeks to find those permutation points,
pP, that maximize a dot product with the translated election
matrix Ed' Here a permutation point is defined as pP = PpXP p
where Pp is the same as before and
x = [x .. ] ={ +0
1
1.)
-1
if i < j
if i j
if i > j
The translated election matrix is defined to be in skew-
symmetric form and is related to the previous election matrix
A by;
Ed = A - A' (3)
As Levenglick has demonstrated 1 , the Kemeny function
equivalently seeks to determine the permutation point of
minimum Euclidean distance from Ed' thus maximizing the total
amount of agreement between pP and Ed" Equivalently, one can
view the problem from the position of choosing the optimal
permutation matrix in the following criterion function
H(p*) = ｾｬ｡ｸ Ed' P I XP
P P P
(4)
1 [4], Theorem 4, p. 41.
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As Levenglick has shown2 , (4) is extremely attractive in
that it "is symmetric, faithful, equitable; Condorcet, con-
sistent and continuous for all m ｾ 2," and its consistent
extension to the set of rationals on Ｈ ｾ Ｉ space is the only
function that satisfies all the above properties.
Theorem 1. The criterion function (4) is an equivalent re-
presentation of (2), and ｨ ･ ｮ ｾ ･ the Combinatorial Optimization
criterion also has the above fairness properties.
Proof. By equivalence is meant that if ｾ Ｈ ｐ Ｑ Ｉ > ｾＨｐＲＩ then
H(P1) > H(P2) and vice versa. Thus equivalence implies
{p} = {p*}; the same ranking of actions optimizes both
criteria. To establish the equivalence we shall introduce
the column vector of m ones labelled e. Furthermore, define
Now, A was defined so that
A + A' = Z
Conditions (3) and (5) together imply
if i = j
otherwise
(5)
Ed = 2A - Z (6)
Similarly, X = Q - Q' and Z = Q + Q' imply
X = 2Q - Z (7)
It is easily seen that
P'ZP = P ZP' = Z
P P P P
2[4], Theorems 5 and 7, pp. 41-44.
(8)
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The dot product operation in (4) is invariant to any
translation T ( ) of Ed and P ｾ X PP that preserves the matchup
of their respective matrix entries. That is
for all such valid T.
T( ) can be considered to be the set of all possible permuta-
tions of the elements of matrix ( ).
T( ) = P ( )P'P P
is a valid form-preserving translation.
Now, (4), (6), (7), (8), and (9) combine to yield:
E ·p'XP =PEP'·PP'XPp'd P P pdp P P P P
(9 )
( 10)
= 4P A P' • Q - 2P A P' • Z - 2Z • Q + Z • Z
P P P P
Since
2P A P' • Z = 2Z • Q = Z • Z = m (m-1)p p
then
E • P' X P = 4P A P' • Q - m (m-1)d p P P P
hence (4) and (2) are equivalent. I I
( 11)
( 12)
Geometrical Interpretation
As Blin and Whinston showed3 , whenever majority voting
yields a transitive social ordering of the ai' the associated
permutation matrix will be optimal for (2). Correspondingly,
ｾＶＭ
the permutation point pP* would be a matrix of +1'8, -1's, and
D's with:
= ｻＫｾ if i = jp •. if a. > a. in the optimal social order1J 1 J
-1 if a. > a. L1 the optimal social order
J 1
p* would be optimal for
R(p*) = Hax E • p Pd
P
(4) ,
Let us define F as the set of all permutation points and
sgn(Ed ) as a matrix of +1's, -1 IS, and D's, whose entries
correspond to the sign of the entries of Ed. Then it is clear
that if sgn(Ed ) £F, then sgn(Ed ) = pP* and majority voting has
yielded a transitive social ordering.
Thus, we can rewrite (4)' as the following equivalent
problem:
rHn Ed' [sgn(Ed ) -Pp]p
Since Z • pP = 0, (13) is equivalent to (14):
J(p*) = min A· [sgn(Ed ) -P
p ]
p
(13 )
(14 )
Thus, if sgn (Ed) f F, we seek a permutation point that will
entail a least cost for moving from an intransitive majority
solution sgn(Ed ) to a transitive social ordering given by p
p
*.
In a geometric sense, sgn(Ed ) and pP are vertices of a hypercube
in Ｈ ｾ Ｉ space, centered about the origin, with edge length of
two. The problem is to choose the closest vertex to sgn(Ed )
that belongs to F, where the measurement of distance is
conditional upon A.
-7-
The following lemma gives necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for determining whether or not sgn (Ed) £ F.
Lemma: Let sgn(Ed ) = [o .. J. If there exist distinct i,j,k1.)
such that sgn(oij) = sgn(ojk) F sgn(oik) then sgn(Ed ) ｾ F.
If no such i, j,k exist then sgn (Ed) £ F.
Proof. If sgn(Oij) = sgn(Ojk) F sgn(oik)' then either
0 .. = o)'k = +1 or -1. In the former case, 0 •• = +1 implies1.) 1.)
a .. - a .. > 0, which in turn means that a 1.' > a). by majority1.) )1.
voting. Thus, 0ij = 0jk = +1 implies
a. > a.1. ) and
a. > a. , ..• , a. > a. t' but a. t > a. •1. 2 1. 3 1. t - 1 1. 1. 1. 1
by majority voting, which is an intransitive ordering.
Thus, sgn(Ed ) ｾｆＮ In the latter case, the proof follows
anal9gously.
The above establishes sufficiency: necessity is now
shown. Assume that no such i,j,k exist that provide in-
transitivity. Since all higher order intransitivities4
require an intransitivity of triplets [2], there must exist
a transitive ordering of the a i provided by sgn(Ed ): hence
majority voting is transitive and optimal, and sgn(Ed ) e: F. II
In graph-theoretic terms, if one places a directed arc
from node i to j to indicate a i > a j , then sgn (Ed) £ F if and
only if there are no directed cycles within the graph. Further-
more, if there are directed cycles, an attempt to eliminate
them by determining whether vertices of the hypercube adjacent
t9 sgn(Ed ) belong, to C will incur a cost of ｾ ｩ ｪ = a ij - aji'
where ｾ ｩ ｪ means that the adjacent vertex only differs in that
component (i,j) is now -1 instead of +1.
Ii A tth d' . t . . t . h . dor er 1.ntrans1. 1.V1. y 1.S C aracter1.ze as a· > a. ,1. 1 1. 2
,..8-
Set Covering Criterion
The optimization problem formulated by Merchant and Rao
is as follows [5]:
s.t.
Min 2'
(i,j)E:C
(8 .. + 8 .. ) (a .. - a .. )y ..1) )1 1) )1 1) (15 )
2 Y >1 k=1,2, ••• ,r(i,j)E:Ck ij
y.. = 0 or 1 ( i , j) E: C
1)
r
C = U Ci and Ck is a directed cycle.i=1
The 8's are just weighting coefficients and as long as they
are constant (say 1/2 for simplicity), the following theorem
holds. Call (15) with constant 8's (15) '.
Theorem 2. (15) is an equivalent representation of (4)
for 8 .. constant V (i,j) E: C.
1)
Proof. (4) is equivalent to (14); hence, it is sufficient to
ｾ ｲ ｧ ｵ ･ that (14) and (15)' are equivalent. As Merchant and
5
Rao demonstrated , the constraints of (15)' ensure that all
old cycles will be eliminated and no new ones created.
From the lemma of the previous section, this is equivalent
to moving from sgn(Ed } to pP • y .. = 1 is equivalent to1)
moving from sgn(Ed } to an adjacent vertex as before, and
the criterion function is the same as 6 ..• Finally, since
1)
the costs of moving to a pP that is not adjacent to sgn(Ed }
are simply additive Ｈ ｾ Ｑ norm used), the criterion function
of (15)' follows. II
5[5], Theorem 1, p.8
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Discussion
Although the three criteria are all equivalent, each
formulation of the social choice problem has unique character-
istics. (2) and (4) are similar in that they are both "primal"
approaches to the problem; both search over the feasible set
of m! permutation matrices, and at each stage of the problem,
a feasible solution is known. In contrast, (15) is a "dual"
approach; ｾ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｬ the y .. are discovered, no feasible solution
1.)
to the problem is known.
In (2) an optimal assignment of actions to ranks is de-
termined, while in (4) a search for the optimal ｭ ｡ ｴ ｾ ｨ ｩ ｮ ｧ of a
permutation point to a translated election matrix is undertaken.
Thus, while both procedures are quadratic assignment problems
of a set of "objects" to "positions," the procedures differ by
reversing the meanings of objects and positions.
Example
In order to illustrate the three approaches we consider
the following example:
Individual Ranking Number with Preference
(a1 a 2 a 3 ) 23
(a2 a 3 a 1) 17
(a 2 a 1 a 3 ) 2
(a 3 a 2 a 1) 8
(a3 a 1 a 2) 10
where a 1 a 2 a 3 means that alternative a 1 is preferred to a 2
and a 2 is preferred to a 3 • Majority voting leads to an in-
transitive solution. In order to analyze the problem we
construct the following:
...,10-
0 33 25 0
6 10
60 60 60 - 60
A 27 0
42
Ed
6 0 24
= 60 60 = - 60 60
35 18 0 10
24 0
60 60 60 - 60
=
o
1
1
o
-1
1
- 1 0
Noting that
x =
o
-1
-1
1
o
-1
1
1
o
we obtain the permutation point:
o
1
1
-1
o
-1
-1
1
o
which is optimal, implying the social order (a 2 a 3 a 1) .
The optimal permutation matrix is:
0 1 0
Pp'" = P = 0 0 1p
1 0 0
0 42 2760 60
A- 18 0 35= 60 60P
33 25 060 60
Computing the solutions we have:
=
42 + 27 + 35
60 =
104
60
H (p*) = 2 (-6 + 10 + 24)60 =
56
60 =
From the majority voting solution we obtain the following
a
graph with a cycle: 2
= 2.!:t.
6 a
a 1 631 = ｾ ｾ a 3
We obtain the set covering problem:
s.t.
Min L
(i,j)e:C
(a .. -a .. )y ..1J J 1 1J C = {(23), (31), (12):}
y .. = 0 or 11J V(i,j) e:C
The optimal solution is
A 1Y12 =
A A
Y23 = Y31 = 0
which is again equivalent.
-12-
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